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Abstract
This paper proposes an experiment about the attitude toward proba-
bilities on a population of portfolio managers. Its aim is to check whether
or not portfolio managers are neutral toward probabilities. Meanwhile,
it presents a experimental protocole that highlights an inconsistency be-
tween two experimental techniques. It also introduces a new functional
form for the probability weighting function. Results unambiguously show
that portfolio managers are not neutral toward probabilities and that they
display a strong heterogeneity in their preferences.
Abstract
Cet article decrit une expérience visant à étudier l’attitude face aux
probabilités d’une population de gérants de portefeuille. Son but est de
vérifier si cette population est neutre face aux probabilités. Le protocole
expérimental utilisé permet par ailleurs de mettre en valeur une inco-
hérence entre deux techniques de révélation des préférences. Une nouvelle
fonction de pondération des probabilités est également introduite. Les
résultats montrent clairement que les gérants de portefeuille déforment
autant les probabilités que les sujets "classiques" participant aux expéri-
ences.
1 Introduction
Expected Utility Theory (henceforth EUT) is by far the most widely used de-
scriptive theory of choice under risk in economics. Since Allais and his famous
paradoxes, it has been recognized that EUT could not replicate choices in some
situations. In order to account for the observed systematic deviations from the
main theory, generalizations of EUT were proposed, notably Prospect Theory by
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and its "rank dependent form" Rank Dependent
Expected Utility Theory (henceforth RDEU) by Quiggin (1982). One of their
innovations is the introduction of what I will call an attitude toward probabilities.
Deviations from EUT were explained by the fact that, unlike what is supposed
in EUT, people did not treat probabilities linearly, and this was modelled by the
so-called probability weighting function. Since then, the shape of this function
has been extensively studied in experiments and the general properties of the
attitude toward probabilities are by now pretty well known. This paper relates
a new experimental investigation on that topic. Its contributions are two fold:
one is experimental, two are methodological.
On the methodological side, a first innovation consists in the specification
of the model being used (a RDEU model). Many functional forms have been
proposed to capture the attitude toward probabilities. Some are one-parameter
functions (Prelec(1998)), others are two-parameter functions like Wu and Gon-
zales (1999) or Lattimore et al. (1992). So far, the parameters of all of the
two-parameter functional forms governed the shape of the function in a similar
way, that is one parameter captured the level of distorsion and the other one
captured the level of elevation. As suggested by Isaac Meilijson 1, I introduce a
new two-parameter weighting function, the cumulative distribution function of
the beta law, whose advantage is that its shape is governed in a different manner.
One parameter captures the degree of overweighting of small probabilities and
the other one captures the degree of underweighting of large probabilities. The
function thus allows to observe the correlation between those two fundamental
properties of the attitude toward probabilities. The correlation over our sample
is up to 80%. I do not think such an effect has ever been highlighted.
The second methodological contribution relates to the particular design of
the experiment. A major shortcoming of experiments is the lack of data they al-
low to get from one individual in one session. As suggested by Jean-Chrisrophe
Vergnaud,a protocole was designed so as to improve the amount of information
extracted from one individual in a given number of questions. The principle
of this design is to take into account the information about an individual that
is obtained at the beginning of the experiment so as to subsequently calibrate
each question in a way that improves the information it provides. To do so, two
elicitation procedures were used, namely the Trade-off method and the Cer-
tainty Equivalent method, that turned out to be inconsistent with each other,
meaning that they made one individual reveal different preferences. As a result,
the original aim of the design could not be fully reached, but this inconsistency
raised very interesting issues about the job done by experiments.
1Isaac Meilijson from the university of Tel Aviv gave me the idea of using the cumulative
distribution function of the beta law as a probability weighting function
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The empirical one relies one the interpretation that should be given to the
concept of attitude toward probabilities. The view carried on by Prospect The-
ory is that non-linearities in the treatment of probabilities is a characteristic
of human behavior that must be considered as preferences, as is the non-linear
treatment of outcomes. It is thus an innate property of human behavior (de-
riving from some evolutionary process). In other words, people are perfectly
aware of the situation and behave in such a way simply because they "like" it.
However, since expected utility remains the rational way of dealing with risk,
one might claim that non-linearities in the treatment of probabilities in experi-
ments only reflect some sort of "naive" behavior. People would not behave that
way if they had a better knowledge or experience of what they are doing. So
people might be able to learn the "efficient " behavior. For instance, according
to Plott (1996), people have expected utility preferences but "these underlying
preferences only surface in choice environment where subjects are given suffi-
cient opportunities and incentives for deliberation and learning " (Gus Van De
Kuilen (2007)) . Gus Van De Kuilen (2007) tested experimentally this hypoth-
esis by asking subjects to make a series of choices with ongoing feedbacks, that
is they could observe the resolution of uncertainty after each choice. He found
that subjects in this setting exhibit a convergence to linearities in their treat-
ment of probabilities, thus showing that experience of a particular risky decision
makes the decision maker converge to EUT. However, those results only sug-
gest that people are expected utility maximizers in the particular setting where
they take repeated decisions and where they observe a resolution of uncertainty
after each choice. Now, many economic decisions cannot be thought of as being
represented by such a frame. Indeed, people often face one-shot decisions with-
out substantial experience about the nature of the underlying risk. So studying
decisions where people do not frequently observe the consequence of their de-
cision remains important. In such a context, is there any place for some kind
of learning? It is hardly contestable that people learn how to generally behave
under risk as they get an experience of it. So, when they get this experience
at dealing with risk, do they tend to behave as expected utility maximizers in
one-shot decisons? Such an issue has been studied by Harbaugh et al. (2002):
they linked the attitude toward probabilities of the respondent to his age (on
a sample going from 5 to 64 years old subjects) and found that the tendency
to transform probabilities tends to diminish with age, suggesting that general
experience of risky decisions makes the attitude toward probabilities tend to
neutrality, even without ongoing feedbacks. Fox et al. (1996) took a different
approach: they ran an experiment on a sample of option traders, people who are
trained at managing risk and selected for their ability to do it. They found that
the median subject of their sample was an expected utility maximizer under
risk, whereas the median subject of population of students showed a non-linear
treatment of probabilities. This also suggests that people converge to neutrality
as they get aware of what they are doing. I will adopt a similar approach here
by running an experiment on a sample of portfolio managers.
Should we expect portfolio managers to be more neutral toward probabili-
ties than anyone else? Portfolio managers are supposed to handle their clients’
financial assets. In order to define the best constitution of a portfolio, they
have to collect information about the economic environment so as to evaluate
the risks associated with different assets. Then, they optimize their investments
with respect to the "taste" of their clients. For instance, if a client asks for a
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high returns portfolio at the cost of a high risk, the portfolio manager has to
compose the "best" portfolio of this type. Therefore, those people deal with
uncertainty everyday, since part of their job is to evaluate the risk (the true
probabilities) associated with assets. They can be viewed as dealing with risk
when they pick the best assets. However, they do not decide with their own
preferences under risk but with their clients’ preferences. Yet, it is reasonable
to think that they have a great level of expertise at deciding under risk. There-
fore, if one thinks that non-linearities in the treatment of probabilities are a
mistake charaterizing the lack of experience of decision making under risk, then
one must expect a population like portfolio managers to be close to neutrality
toward probabilities (at least closer than people who are not trained at dealing
with risk). An experiment was therefore run in order to find out whether the
portfolio manager display a neutral attitude toward probabilities. While results
show that portfolio managers are more consistent than "usual subjects" in the
sense that there answers fit closer to a given model of decision, results clearly
show that they do not treat probabilities linearly, and even suggest that they
are not closer to linearity than "usual subjects" .
The paper will be organized as follows: in the first section, I explain the basic
concepts of the models used in decision under risk. I define what the attitude
toward probabilities is. Then, I present the specification being used. I introduce
a new functional form for the probability weighting function. The third part is
devoted to the experiment and the inconsistencies it helped highlight. The last
section covers the results.
2 Introduction to the descriptive analysis of de-
cision under risk
I shall describe here the basic concepts of the descriptive analysis of decision
under risk, emphasizing that of attitude toward probabilities. A decision is
taken under risk if the decision maker does not know the consequence of his
decision with certainty. However, by opposition to uncertainty, he knows all of
the possible events as well as their objective probabilities. Such a decision can
be seen as choosing one among a set of lotteries, where a lottery is defined as
a distribution of probabilities over a set of outcomes. Therefore, risky decisions
are often studied by making people choose between lotteries involving monetary
outcomes. The aim of the descriptive analysis of decision under risk is then to
be able to replicate people’s choices between lotteries. EUT states that choices
between loteries can be accounted for by comparing their expected utility. For
instance, (x, p; 0, 1 − p)  (x′, p′; 0, 1 − p′) if and only if pv(x) > p′v(x′) with
v(0) = 0, (x, p; 0, 1− p) being the lottery that gives a probability p of winning x
euros and the probability 1−p of winning 0 2. v(.) is called the value function and
is unique up to a increasing affine transformation. It can be seen as representing
an attitude toward outcomes. People do not treat outcomes linearly in their
evaluation of the utility of a lottery.
However, as first demonstrated by Allais (1953), EUT can not explain peo-
ple’s choices in some particular contexts. I present an exemple highlighting one
2I will only use lotteries of this type in the paper
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intuitive shortcoming of EUT. Consider the lottery:
(1000000, p; 0, 1− p).
How much would you pay for it? If your behavior under risk is well described
by EUT, then the maximum price at which you can buy the lottery is given by
its certainty equivalent, defined as:
v(ce) = pv(1000000)
hence,
ce = 1000000v−1(p)
Now if one assumes that v(.) is a concave function then the certainty equivalent
is a convex function of p. This implies that the higher the probability of win-
ning, the stronger the effect of a given variation of probability on the certainty
equivalent. For example, increasing the probability of winning from 0.4 to 0.5
has more impact on the certainty equivalent than increasing it from 0 to 0.1,
and it has a lower impact than increasing it from 0.9 to 1. Whereas the second
claim sounds intuitive, the first one does not. Indeed, many readers would pay
more for getting a possibility of winning than for increasing their probability
of winning from 0.4 to 0.5. This pattern of behavior consisting of paying more
for an increase of probability occuring at the extremes of the probability range
cannot be accounted for by EUT unless one considers value functions convex for
small gains and concave for big gains for instance. Since the behavioral pattern
we have seen seems to exist for any level of gains, this explanation does not
hold.
A solution to this puzzle consists in considering that people do not treat proba-
bilities linearly in the evaluation of the utility of a lottery. Such a solution was
proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). In their famous Prospect Theory,
the evaluation of the utility of a lottery involved not only an attitude toward out-
comes, but also an attitude toward probabilities represented by a function called
the probability weighting function. Formally, (x, p; 0, 1− p)  (x′, p′; 0, 1− p′) if
and only if w(p)v(x) > w(p′)v(x′) where w(.) is the probability weighting func-
tion. It maps the probability range into [0, 1] with w(0) = 0, w(1) = 1 and w(.)
strictly increasing. This function thus associates to any objective probability a
decision weight, that is to say a transformation of the probability that will be
used in the computation of the utility of the lottery. Note that those weights
are not the result of a bias in the evaluation of probabilities, since objective
probabilities are known under risk. The way an individual transform probabili-
ties in Prospect Theory must rather be seen as preferences under risk, as is the
transformation of outcomes.
The structure of attitude toward probabilities was extensively studied by exper-
iments. The results highlighted three properties for the probability weighting
function representing a common structure of attitude toward probabilities. I
use Prelec’s terminology to present these properties.
1. Over/Underweighting
The decision weight associated to a small probability is generally higher
than this probability while the decision weight associated to a medium or
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large probability is generally lower than the probabability. This property
is necessary to generate the observed pattern of risk behavior, that is risk
seeking for small probabilities and risk aversion for medium and large
probabilities.
2. Decreasing Relative Sensitivity (also called subproportionality)
This property derives from the observation of the so-called common ratio
effect. The common ratio effect is a particular behavior widely observed
when people are facing two choices, each between two lotteries calibrated
in a special way (it was first set out by Allais (1953)). For instance, when
an individual is facing the following choices:
(300, 0.9) vs 100 and (300, 0.09) vs (100, 0.1)
he is very likely to choose the 100 euros in the first choice and the lotery
(300, 0.09) in the second one. Expressing those choices within the frame-
work of Prospect Theory yields the two inequalities:
w(0.9)v(300) < v(100) and w(0.09)v(300) > w(0.1)v(100)
or equivalently,
w(0.9) < v(100)v(300 <
w(0.09)
w(0.1)
On this example, we can see that decreasing both probabilities by 90%,
make the associated weights diminish in different proportions. More pre-
cisely, the weight of the lower probability has diminished from a lower
proportion than the weight of the higher probability, thus making the
agent prefer the lottery involving 300 euros once the probabilities of both
loteries have been decreased by 90 percent. Since this behavior was ob-
served for the whole range of probabilities, the common ratio effect was
turned into a general property of the attitude toward probabilities called
the diminishing relative sensitivity that can now be defined as: decreasing
two probabilities in the same proportions make the weight of the lower
probability decrease in a lower proportion than the weight of the higher
probability.
3. Increasing absolute sensitivity near p = 0 and p = 1
This last property of w(.) states that a given variation of probabilities
will have a stronger impact on the utility of a lottery if it occurs near
the endpoints of the range of probabilities than in the middle of it. Our
first example was an illustration of that principle. The implication for
the shape of the probability weighting function is that it must be concave
for small probabilities and convex for large ones with an inflexion point
somewhere in the middle of the interval [0,1].
To sum up, Prospect Theory stated that Expected Utility Theory needed to be
generalized by taking the attitude toward probabilities into account and that
this could be done by replacing probabilities by decision weights in the weighted
average of outcomes evaluating the utility of a lotery.
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"Improvements" of the theory were proposed afterwards, notably because Prospect
Theory obliged the agent to violate first order dominance on some special
choices. Rank Dependent Expected Utility Theory (henceforth RDEUT) by
Quiggin (1982) was the first theory tackling this problem while maintaining the
main characteristics of Prospect Theory. I do not further explain the differences
between Prospect Theory and RDEUT since both theories are equivalent on the
type of lotteries I have used in the experiment. I will consider for the rest of
the paper that I work within the RDEU framework.
3 The specification
In this section, I fully describe the model I have chosen to estimate knowing that
the theory will be the RDEU theory. As stated in the first section, a RDEU
decision maker is characterized by two functions: the value function v(.) and
the probability weighting function w(.).
The value function will be a power function, v(x) = xλ. Three functions
are often retained in the experimental litterature: the power function, the ex-
ponential function, and the expo-power function. The most widely used in the
experimental litterature is the power function. However, there is no consen-
sus about which one of them should be used. Wakker and Tversky (1993) and
Kahneman and Tversky (1992) showed that the power function was normatively
attractive. However, from the empirical point of view, it is for now impossible
to claim that one fits better than the other two.
As suggested informally by Isaac Meilijson, the probability weighting func-
tion will be represented by the cumulative distribution function of the beta law
(henceforth betacdf): betacdf(p, α, β). Since it is the first time that such a
specification is used, let me introduce its characteristics. First, it respects all of
the three properties described in the first part, namely the over/underweighting
of small/large probabilities, the decreasing relative sensitivity and the increas-
ing absolute sensitivity near 0 and 1. Second it is a two parameter function
(the parameters are α and β). According to our data, it seems more relevant
to represent the attitude toward probabilities with a two parameter function
than with a one parameter function like the one introduced by Prelec (1998)
for instance. In effect, since our aim is here to describe the attitude toward
probabilities of each individual, a one parameter function would not be flexi-
ble enough to fit the data. Third it fits the data as well as other existing two
parameter functions like those introduced by Prelec (1998) or Wu and Gon-
zales (1999). What is interesting about this function is the way in which the
two parameters govern its shape. To explain this last statement, let me recall
how previous functional forms work. In many of them, one parameter governs
the degree of curvature of the function and the other one governs its elevation.
Wu and Gonzales (1999) associated psychophysical characteristics with each of
the parameters of their function. The parameter governing curvature is seen
as representing "discriminability" while the one governing elevation is seen as
representing "attractiveness" (figures 1 and 2).
The new function presented here, the betacdf, is governed in the way shown
in figure 3 and 4. One parameter governs the intensity of overweighting of small
probabilities (α) and the other one governs the intensity of underweighting of
6
Figure 1: The shape of the probabillity weighting function of Wu and Gonzales
(1999) with respect to the parameter governing curvature.
Figure 2: The shape of the probabillity weighting function of Wu and Gonzales
(1999) with respect to the parameter governing elevation.
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large probabilities (β). More precisely, when both parameters equal 1, the func-
tion is linear. The closer to 0 α and β, the higher the degree of respectively
overweighting of small probabilities and underweighting of large probabilities.
Therefore, the betacdf reproduces the inverse S shaped probability weighting
function when α and β are smaller than one, as shown in figure 5. On the
contrary, if both parameters are higher than 1, the function will show under-
weighting of small probabilities and overweighting of large probabilities. Note
that the point at which the curve crosses the diagonal depends on the relative
value of both parameters. For instance, if α is smaller than β then the curve
crosses the diagonal at p > 0.5. This represents the fact that the subject over-
weights small probabilities more than he underweights large probabilities . If
both parameters are equal then the diagonal is crossed at p = 0.5. We can try
to give an interpretation to those parameters. α and β can be viewed as rep-
resenting the intensity of absolute sensitivity near respectively 0 and 1. They
therefore show how strong will be the possibility and certainty effects on an
individual’s choices. A possible interest of this function is that the correlation
between the two parameters represents the correlation between absolute sensi-
tivity near 0 and absolute sensitivity near 1. I do not think it has been shown
that those characteristics were related.
The stochastic model relating the theory to observed binary choices will be a
Fechner model of random errors (Hey and Orme(1994)). I could have chosen two
other stochastic models, namely the Tremble model from (Harless and Camerer
(1994) ) and the Random Utility model from (Loomes and Sugden (1995), but
the Fechner model has proved to be superior at fitting the data (see Wilcox
2007(b)). I will further assume that the errors are normally distributed and
homoskedastic 3. I will explain more precisely how the stochastic model is used
in the last section.
Now I have precised the theoritical framework I have chosen, I shall move on to
the way data were collected.
4 The experiment
The experiment was conducted at the Laboratoire d’Economie Experimentale
de Paris 1 (LEEP) under the supervision of Michèle Cohen, Maxim Frolov and
Jean-Marc Tallon. We got 89 "usual subjects" of the LEEP and 16 portfolio
managers from the asset management firm PMA gestion. As previously stated,
this study is about the attitude toward probabilities of portfolio managers. The
group of "usual subjects" will therefore be used to compare results.
A few weeks before the experiment, the group of portfolio managers received a
lecture about the field of decision under risk and uncertainty so as to familiarize
themselves with the concepts and especially the experimental tools being used.
The experiment was not only about decision under risk. There were a few
questions about decision under ambiguity afterwards. The subjects were all
introduced to the aim of the experiment, as well as its rules during around 20
minutes. They were specially briefed about the incentive scheme, so as to make
sure that they were convinced to be "playing" for real money. The gains went
from 5 euros to 120 euros. The average payment was around 30 euros. From
3The latter assumption implies that I do not take into account recent advances about the
way the noise can be modeled (see Blatavskyy (2007))
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Figure 3: The shape of the betacdf with respect to the parameter governing the
degree of overweighting of small probabilities
Figure 4: The shape of the betacdf with respect to the parameter governing the
degree of underweighting of large probabilities
Figure 5: The betacdf when α = 0.5 and β = 0.3
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a student’s point of view, such an expected payoff is definitely worth thinking
things through carefully. From an asset manager’s point of view, it is probably
not. However, they had a powerful incentive to answer as if it were important:
curiousity. Indeed, they were told during the lecture a few weeks before the
experiment that they would get their own results afterwards, and that those
results would be studied to explain behaviors on financial markets. This is the
reason why I am confident that the data they delivered would not have been
more reliable with greater monetary incentives.
In the part about decision under risk, each subject was asked around 60 ques-
tions. Answering this part took the respondents 7 minutes on average. I now
precisely describe the protocole of the experiment since its particular design
lead us to interesting insights about some experimental tools.
4.1 The protocole
It was originally designed so as to improve the amount of information extracted
from one individual in a given number of questions, because a major shortcoming
of experiments is the small number of questions that can be asked to a subject
in one session. Indeed, an individual is likely to get tired (bored) before having
answered 100 binary choices, so that asking him too many questions would make
him provide "noisy" answers. A way to improve the amount of information
obtained from a given number of questions is to ask "good questions". For
instance, it is useless to ask an individual who has previously shown a strong risk
aversion for a given probability of winning to choose between a lottery involving
this same probability of winning and its mathematical expectation. Indeed,
the answer can be predicted by the experimentalist almost with certainty. In
that case, a good way of proceeding to avoid asking useless questions is to take
our previous information about the subject’s behavior into account to calibrate
the question in a smart way. Here, this would mean asking him to choose
between the lottery and some amount of money smaller than the mathematical
expectation. Therefore the principle of the protocole is to get a first idea about
the individual’s preferences (assuming that he is RDEU maximizer) on a first
set of questions and subsequently to use this information to ask only "smart"
questions. The protocole is thus divided in three parts:
1. In the first part, the value function is elicited.
2. The second part determines the probability weighting function
3. At the beginning of the third part, we have our first idea about the way
the individual behaves under risk since we have roughly determined his
preferences in a RDEU model. The third part is then composed of "smart"
questions.
The first part uses the so-called Trade-off method (TO method) from Wakker
and Deneffe (1996). It is a way of calibrating questions asked to a subject so as
to make him reveal his value function independently of his probability weight-
ing function. It is based on the following property of the RDEU model: if an
individual shows indifference between the lotteries:
(x0, p;R, 1− p) and (x1, p; r, 1− p)
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Figure 6: Examples of values elicited from the Trade-off methods for an indi-
vidual with a concave value function
as well as between the lotteries:
(x1, p;R, 1− p) and (x2, p; r, 1− p)
where x0 > R > r, then a few calculations within the framework of the RDEU
model show that:
v(x1)− v(x0) = v(x2)− v(x1)
In other words, these preferences imply that x0, x1 and x2 are equally spaced
in term of utility for the individual.
In practice, the researcher fixes x0, p, r and R and makes the subject reveal
the x1 that makes him indifferent between the first two lotteries by a series of
binary choices (I used the so-called bisection method to determine the x1. I will
explain later what this consists in). In our case, x0 = 20, p = 0.5, r = 0 and
R = 10. Once I had a series of gains x0, x1, x2, x3 equally spaced in terms of
utility, I used a non linear least squares approximation to get the value of the
parameter of the weighting function. Figure 6 shows how should be distributed
the values x1, x2 and x3 relative to each other in the case of a concave value
function.
The second part of the protocole, in which the probability weighting function
is elicited, was based on the CE method: this method is simpler than the
previous one since it just consists in making the subject reveal his certainty
equivalent for a given lottery by a series of binary choices between the lottery
and some certain amounts of money (again using the bisection method).
How was this information used to determine the shape of the probability
weighting function?
Consider the following lottery:
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(x, p; 0, 1− p)
By setting v(0) = 0, the rank dependent expected utility of this lottery is:
VRDEU (L) = w(p)v(x)
The certainty equivalent ce of the lottery is defined as:
v(ce) = w(p)v(x)
so,
w(p) =
v(x)
v(ce)
.
With our specification of the value function,
w(p) = (
x
ce
)λ
The researcher sets the values of p and x and the subject reveals ce. Given that
the value of λ, the parameter of the value function, is estimated from the first
part, every certainty equivalent observed directly indicates the transformation
of the probability p through the probability weighting function (assuming that
the estimated value of lambda is the right one).
I therefore used this property to roughly determine the shape of the proba-
bility weighting function, by making the subject reveal his certainty equivalents
for the lotteries: (x, p; 0, 1− p) with p = 0.1, 0.5, 0.9 and x = 50, 80 euros. The
shape was then determined with 6 points. Actually, these 6 points provided two
evaluations with three points each of the probability weighting function: one
for 50 euros and one for 80 euros, so that I could check the consistency of the
elicitated decision weights. Figure 7 shows an example of those two evaluations
of the probability weighting function for one individual. This individual clearly
exhibits a "classic" inverse S shaped weighting function.
At this step, note that some individuals did not provide answers consistent
enough to allow evaluate their preferences. I therefore had to class the individ-
uals by group, depending on how well their preferences could be identified:
• Group 1 contains the subjects whose preferences could be completely eval-
uated, that is to say I got an estimation of both their value function and
their probability weighting function.
• Group 2 is composed of people for which only the value function could
be estimated. Their answers in the second part did not allow to clearly
identify some profile of the probability weighting function. More precisely,
the individual exhibited different attitudes toward probabilities when the
gain was 50 euros and when it was 80 euros. Figure 8 shows the elicited
probability weighting function of an individual in group 2. As you can
see, this individual overweighted the probability 0.5 when the gain was 50
euros and he underweighted it when the gain was 80 euros.
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Figure 7: Evaluation of the probability weighting function, based on the first 6
certainty equivalents elicitated during the second step of the protocole
Figure 8: Evaluation of the probability weighting function, based on the first 6
certainty equivalents elicitated during the second step of the protocole, for an
individual from group 2
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• Group 3 is composed of people who could not be identified at all. I will
explain what happened with those individuals after having described the
bisection technique.
Once the outliers were removed the composition of groups was the following:
there were 42 subjects in group 1 (and 11 portfolio managers), 10 individuals
in group 2 (2 portfolio managers), and 38 individuals in group 3 (2 portfolio
managers).
The third part, in which questions were adapted to the individual’s known
behavior was also based on the CE method with the same type of lotter-
ies. I added 9 other certainty equivalents corresponding to the lotteries in-
volving p = 0.3, 0.7 and x = 50, 80 euros and to the lotteries involving p =
0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 and x = 20 euros. 4 As in the first two parts, the tech-
nique for making the individual reveal his certainty equivalent using a series of
binary choices was the bisection method. I need to explain what this method
does in order to go further. The researcher wants to know, say the certainty
equivalent of the lotery (x, p; 0, p). He is going to fix minimum and maximum
values for this certainty equivalent: cemin, cemax. Then he asks the subject to
choose between the lottery and the middle of the interval [cemin, cemax], cecent.
If the subjet picks the lottery, then his certainty equivalent lies within the in-
terval [cecent, cemax] (on the contrary, if he prefers the amount of money, then
his certainty equivalent is within the interval [cemin, cecent]). Therefore, those
two values now represent the minimum and maximum levels for the certainty
equivalent. The subject can be asked again to choose between the lottery and
the middle of this new interval. By repeating the same operation a few times,
the researcher gets a small interval in which relies the certainty equivalent. For
instance, with the lottery (80, 0.5, 0, 0.5), I repeated the operation 4 times (that
is I asked the individual to make 4 binary choices), and I got the certainty
equivalent within one the following intervals: [0, 5], [5, 10],...[70, 75], [75, 80].
Let me now explain how I managed to calibrate questions. I adjusted the
center of the interval [cemin, cemax]. Indeed, once the preferences of an indi-
vidual were evaluated, at the end of the first two steps, I had a prior on his
certainty equivalent for any new lottery. I used this prior to fix cecent at the
level of this anticipated certainty equivalent for all subsequent lotteries. More-
over, I reduced the width of the interval [cemin, cemax]. The individual had
thus no obvious choices to make, since he was directly close to his "switching
point". Therefore, if the first evaluation was right, I could precisely determine
the individual’s certainty equivalent by asking fewer questions.
Of course, I could apply this procedure on the individuals in group 1 since I
had a first approximation of their preferences. However, I coud not apply with
much precision the procedure on group 2 and even more on group 3, that is to
say people had to answer some obvious questions during the whole experiment.
This way of proceeding has a shortcoming: consider the case where the
individual’s choices indicate that the certainty equivalent in contained in one
of the extreme intervals. With the lottery (80, 0.5; 0, 0.5), if the answers lead
4I elicitated the certainty equivalents of the same lotteries for all subjects (whathever the
group in which they were attached), but depending on their degree of identification, this
elicitation was more or less precise. Of course, the more I knew about the preferences after
the first two steps, the more precise was the elicitation of the certainty equivalent.
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to the interval [75, 80], the only conclusion we can make is that the certainty
equivalent is higher than 75 euros but we cannot put an upper bound on it. Of
course, in that example, it does not matter since the certainty equivalent cannot
be expected to be higher than 80 euros. On the contrary, one can easily see that
this is going to be an issue if I reduce subtantially the width of the interval. In
that case, if the certainty equivalent is in the "top" interval, it is likely that it is
in fact higher than what we elicited. As we will see later, this indeed prevented
me from getting with certainty some of the 15 certainty equivalents for most of
the individuals.
I can now go back to the existence of group 3, the group of people who
were not identified at all. The parameter of their value function could not be
estimated in the first part (using the Trade-off method) and they were then con-
sidered as totally unknown (I could not identify the attitude toward probabilities
either, because I would have needed an estimation of the value function in order
to estimate the probability weighting function). How come the protocole failed
estimating their value function? The reason is related to the shortcoming I just
explained. The bisection method was used to elicit the values x1, x2 and x3.
Many people exhibited a value of x3 in the "top interval" so that I did not know
whether I had the right value. Since the estimation of the parameter of the
value function was entirely based on the three values, I considered that it was
not known.
To sum up, I had for each individual at the end of the experiment:
• one first estimation of the parameter of the value function from step 1
(TO method)
• 15 certainty equivalents coming from around 50 binary choices (CE meth-
ods)
• the group in which the individual was classed, that is the extent to which
his profile could be identified
Now the protocole has been described, I can move to a first unexpected result,
the inconsistency of the two elicitation methods (TO and CE).
4.2 The inconsistency between the TO and CE methods
Another problem arised from the design of the experiment. The identification of
preferences operated in the first two parts of the protocole did not work so well
because the two elicitation methods being used (CE and TO methods) turned
out to be inconsistent with each other. More precisely, I estimated the whole
model on the binary choices I got from the last two parts (where the CE method
was used). I then compared the values of the parameter of the value function
obtained from this estimation (based on the CE method) to the value of the
same parameter obtained in the first part (using the TO method). In table 1, I
took both values of the same parameter for all the individuals in the population
of the usual subjects of the LEEP and in the population of the portfolio man-
agers, and I computed their means in both populations as well as the correlation
between those two different evaluations of the same parameter.
The results show that both ways of estimating do not provide the same val-
ues. Indeed, the correlation should have been close to 1 if they did. Even more
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Usual Subjects Portfolio Managers
Mean(lambdaCE) 0.57 0.68
Mean(lambdaTO) 0.92 0.92
Corr(lambdaCE,lambdaTO) -0.16 -0.26
Table 1: Consistency of the estimations of the parameter of the value function
from the Trade-off method and the Certainty Equivalent method
interesting, the mean of this parameter from the CE method is significantly
lower than the mean from the Trade-off method.
How can we interpret such a result? Note first that one can find previous
works showing such an inconsistency: Abdellaoui (2000) found a mean of the
parameter lambda up to 0.9 using the Trade-off method, while Wu and Gonzales
(1999) found a mean of 0.49 using the CE method. However I could not find any
paper noticing and explaining this issue. I will therefore propose some possible
interpretations that would be worth being tested.
The interpretation can raise questions about either the experimental meth-
ods or the way of modelizing deicision making under risk.
On the one hand, one can solve the problem by claiming that one of the two
methods does not provide relevant behaviors, so that the preferences revealed
are not the true preferences under risk. More precisely, the argument could be
stated as follows: the task asked in the Trade-off method is too difficult in the
sense that subjects cannot really comprehend a choice between two lotteries,
unlike the CE method in which individuals can more easily tell whether or not
they would buy a lottery for a given price.
On the other hand, if one thinks that both experimental tasks provide a
relevant behavior (that is worth being studied), then the model himself must be
questioned. One might say that we just have not found the right model and that
we shall seek for new one able to rationalize the observed behaviors based on
unique preferences. However, it could also be claimed that the problem relates
more generally to the way economists model deciision under risk. Indeed, it is
reasonable to think that the observed discrepancy comes from the fact that peple
use two different cognitive processes to make decision in the two different frames,
resulting in different preferences when behaviors are grasped through a RDEU
model. This kind of explanation is bad for economics because it implies that
preferences are actually governed by the frame in which the choice is presented.
An individual cannot be seen anymore as having one single preference ordering
over lotteries. From that point of view then, it would be more relevant to
modelize directly the cognitive process being used.
All this is pure speculation but I think it is a problem that is worth being
studied. For now, I will not use the data from the TO method, I will rather
focus on the answers from the CE method, that is around 50 binary choices.
16
5 The results
5.1 The econometric tools
In order to estimate the model, I used the binary choices made by each indi-
vidual. 5. Therefore, for each individual I had a sample of around 50 binary
responses. Each choice the individual made can be modelled within the RDEU
framework in the following way:
(g, p; 0, 1− p)  c
where c is a certain amount of money, is equivalent to
w(p)v(g) > v(c)
The stochastic model retained, the Fechner model of homoskestatic random er-
rors, associates the distance between the utilities of the two options (w(p)v(g)−
v(c)) with a probability of choosing the first one. It does so by applying on this
distance an increasing function Φ that maps R into [0, 1], with Φ(0) = 0.5 and
Φ(x) = 1−Φ(−x). In our case, this function will be the cumulative distribution
function of the normal law. Taking a Fechner model with this function is the
same as assuming that there is an error in the process of evaluation of the utility
of an option and that this error is normally distributed with variance equal to 1.
In that case, the Fechner model is a probit model. Note that the latent variable
is the distance of utility between the two options, which is a non-linear form of
the parameters. The log-likelihood associated with some observed set of choices
can be written as:∑L
i=1(yilog(Φ(w(pi)v(gi)− v(ci)) + (1− yi)log(1− Φ(w(pi)v(gi)− v(ci)))
where L is the number of choices the individual had to make, yi takes the value
1 if the lottery is chosen and the value 0 if the sure amount is picked. Each
question i involves different values pi, ci and gi.
To estimate the model, I maximized this function with respect to the three
parameters α, β and λ for each individual using the maxlik procedure of the
econometrics toolbox of Matlab 7b. The same estimation was performed by
Maxim Frolov using the NLP procedure of SAS. This procedure also provided
estimations of the standard deviations of the estimators. Those standard de-
viations were also computed by bootstrap so as to check the reliability of the
estimations provided by SAS. The results provided by both methods were in-
deed consistent. I then used the standard deviations coming from SAS. The
estimated coefficients of the portfolio managers’ models and the corresponding
standard deviations of the estimators are shown in table 2. I also computed
confidence intervals (at a level of 10%) assuming that the estimators were nor-
mally distributed. Again, the relevance of this assumption was confirmed by
the results from bootstrap. The confidence intervals for the portfolio manager’s
models are shown in table 3.
Besides of these econometric tools, I use graphics of the probability weighting
function to easily visualize the results. This representation is obtained as the one
described in the second part of the protocole. I briefly recall how I proceed to
5I could not use the certainty equivalent because some certainty equivalents were not known
for sure
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get it. We have 15 certainty equivalents corresponding to 15 lotteries involving
the outcomes 20, 50 and 80 euros and the probabilities 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9.
Since the lotteries I use are all of the type (x, p; 0, 1− p), the following equation
holds:
w(p) = (
ce
x
)λ
where λ is the parameter of the value function. Its value will now be the one
estimated by the maximum likelihood procedure.
Given this value of λ, each observed certainty equivalent indicates the de-
cision weight associated to the probability p. We therefore have three different
representations of the probability weighting function: one for each outcome.
And each of those representations is composed of five points, corresponding
to the five probabilities involved. This allows checking whether the individual
has the same attitude toward probabilities for every gain and more generally
whether he is consistent in his choices. I also recall that some of the certainty
equivalents elicited could not be the right ones, due to the problem described
in the section devoted to the experiment. Some certainty equivalents might be
higher (lower) than the number we have gotten. Since the decision weight is
computed using directly the elicited value of the certainty equivalent, it will
suffer from the same uncertainty about its true value. If the true certainty
equivalent is possibly higher (lower) than the elicited value, the corresponding
decision weight will also be possibly higher (lower) than what is displayed. I
therefore indicate on the graph representing the probability weighting function
which ones of the decision weights could be actually higher or lower than what is
showed: an arrow pointing down (up) indicates that the decision weight might
be lower (higher). I have plotted the three curves for each portfolio managers on
figure 8. The blue one represents the evaluation of the weighting function when
the gain is up to 20 euros. The green and red ones respectively concern the
gains of 50 and 80 euros. The fourth curve (the smooth one) is the parametric
weighting function with the parameters α and β estimated by the maximum
likelihood procedure.
Results are divided in four parts: the first one is about the new specification
for the probability weighting function; the second one is about the individual
results about the attitude toward probabilities of portfolio managers; the third
one is devoted to the aggregated results. An interpretation is given in the fourth
part.
5.2 Results about the new specification
As I previously explained, the betacdf fits the data in the same way as preceeding
two-parameter functional forms. Its contribution then relies in the correlation
it allows to compute. The correlation between the two parameters α and β can
be seen as reprensenting the link between the degree of increasing sensitivity
near 0 and the degree of increasing sensitivity near 1. I have plotted estimated
values of α and β over the whole population in figure 3: it shows a strong
positive correlation up to 80%. This result suggests that people who are very
"sensitive" at one side of the probability range are also sensitive at the other
side.
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Figure 9: Couples of estimated (α, β) over the whole population
5.3 Individual Results
The first striking result of the study concerns the "quality" of the data pro-
vided by the portfolio managers. Indeed, the comparison between the curves of
portfolio managers and the rest of the population reveals that the three curves
of portfolio managers are generally much closer to each other than the three
curves of normal subjects. To see this, I have also plotted the curves of ten rep-
resentative individuals from the LEEP’s sample in figure 9. This result seems
consistent with the fact that portfolio managers have a great expertise at han-
dling decision making under risk. Even if some certainty equivalents might be
under/overestimated, I think the picture remains quite clear. Each portfolio
managers unambiguously shows a certain pattern of distortion of probabilities,
and each one of them seems to fit this pattern pretty closely.
Second, from the same graphics it seems obvious that the portfolio man-
agers are not all neutral toward probabilities. All the portfolio managers distort
significantly the objective probabilities, that is the confidence interval shown in
table 3 of at least one of the two parameters of the weighting function does not
contain 1. Actually, almost all of them have parameters α and β significantly
lower than 1 (except for indivual 6 whose α may be equal to one). So, almost
all of them exhibit the classic inverse S shape of the probability weighting func-
tion. Except for the individual 6 they all have a concave value function. In
other words, they respect the principle of diminishing sensitivity for both out-
comes and probabilities. At the individual level then, it is hardly contestable
that portfolio managers distort probabilities.
The third interesting result concerns the diversity of attitude toward prob-
abilities in the sample of portfolio managers. As I said, they all show the
classic pattern of attitude toward probabilities, nevertheless, they are very dif-
ferent from each other in the degree of over/underweighting of probabilities.
This shows that pooling the data without checking them at the individual level
would cause a real loss of information. Moreover, this shows that a one parame-
ter functional form like that introduced by Prelec (1998) is not flexible enough to
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Figure 10: The elicited attitude toward probabilities for every portfolio manager
21
Figure 11: The elicited attitude toward probabilities of a subject from the LEEP
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Coefficeint alpha(std) beta(std) lambda(std)
indiv1 0.19 ( 0.07) 0.46 (0.12) 0.56 (0.08)
indiv 2 0.55 (0.09 ) 0.46 (0.07) 0.65 (0.06)
indiv 3 0.43 (0.07) 0.7 (0.10) 0.69 (0.06)
indiv 4 0.28 (0.08) 0.34 (0.09) 0.54 (0.05)
indiv 5 0.25 (0.05) 0.22 ( 0.04) 0.60 (0.06)
indiv 6 0.96 (0.08) 0.79 (0.03) 1.06 (0.08)
indiv 7 0.63 (0.08) 0.46 (0.06) 0.72 (0.07)
indiv 8 0.68 (0.07) 0.55 (0.03) 0.89 (0.07)
indiv 9 0.21 (0.06) 0.21 (0.05) 0.59 (0.06)
indiv10 0.65 (0.19) 0.48 (0.10) 0.56 (0.07)
indiv11 0.29 (0.08) 0.62 (0.19) 0.56 (0.09)
indiv12 0.53 (0.06) 0.70 (0.03) 0.69 (0.08)
indiv13 0.41 (0.08) 0.5 (0.10) 0.56 (0.05)
indiv14 0.31 (0.07) 0.16 (0.08) 0.75 (0.07)
indiv 15 0.38 (0.06) 0.23 (0.03) 0.77 (0.07)
Table 2: Estimated coefficients (with the associated standard error) of the model
for every portfolio manager
Confidence Interval alpha beta lambda
indiv 1 [0.07,0.30] [0.25,0.67] [0.42,0.69]
indiv2 [0.38 , 0.71] [0.33, 0.58] [0.53, 0.76]
indiv3 [ 0.30, 0.55] [ 0.53,0.86] [ 0.59,0.78]
indiv4 [ 0.14,0.41] [0.18 ,0.49] [0.44, 0.71]
indiv5 [ 0.15 ,0.34] [0.13,0.30] [ 0.48,0.63]
indiv6 [0.81,1.10] [ 0.73, 0.84] [0.91,1.20]
indiv7 [0.48,0.77] [0.36,0.55] [0.60,0.83]
indiv8 [0.55,0.80] [ 0.48,0.61] [0.76, 1.01]
indiv9 [ 0.10, 0.31] [ 0.12, 0.29 ] [0.47, 0.70]
indiv10 [0.32, 0.97 ] [0.31,0.64] [0.43,0.68]
indiv11 [ 0.15, 0.42] [0.30,0.93] [0.39,0.72]
indiv12 [0.42, 0.63] [0.64,0.75] [0.55, 0.82]
indiv13 [0.26, 0.55] [0.32,0.67] [0.46,0.65]
indiv14 [0.18,0.43] [ 0.02,0.29] [0.63, 0.86]
indiv15 [ 0.26 , 0.49] [0.17, 0.28] [0.64,0.89]
Table 3: Confidence intervals associated with the estimated coefficients of Table
2 at a level of 10%
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capture the attitude toward probabilities at the individual level, since it obliges
the probability weighting function to cross the diagonal at a given point (1/e).
I can now move on to the study of agregated result.
5.4 Aggregated Results
Results on agregated data are also provided in order to compare my study
to that from Fox et al. (1996). since their study consisted in an experiment
about decision under risk on a sample of options traders, people who are to
be expected to have a great aptitude at dealing with decision making under
risk, as are the portfolio managers. The technique used to elicit preferences is
also similar to what is done in the present experiment. They proceeded in two
steps: the first one was supposed to elicit the value function (and was based on
the same principle as the Trade-off method), the second one elicited decision
weights (using the certainty equivalent method). However, they did not use the
bisection method. They did not even use binary choices. Rather, they directly
asked the value of interest to the subject. For example, when they wanted
to elicit a certainty equivalent, they directly asked the subject to provide the
maximum price at which he would buy the lottery.
Although both the population of interest and the elicitation technique can
be seen as pretty similar, the way Fox et al. (1996) treated the data is quite
different from what I did up to now.
First, they found in their first step that 80% of the subjects displayed a linear
value function. Furthermore, the median individual also exhibited linearity in
the treatment of outcomes. Unlike what I did, they kept those results and used
them to elicit the decision weights.
Moreover, the elicited decision weights were agregated, meaning that Fox
et al. (1996) took, for each probability, the median decision weight. They
thus constructed the median probability weighting function of their sample (
considering that the value function was linear). The median attitude toward
probability was thus found to be neutral, that is the function was linear. Since,
they found in previous studies on students that the median probability weighting
function had the classic inverse S shape, they concluded that those results must
be taken as evidence that option traders are expected utility maximizers.
In order to check whether their results are consistent with ours, I computed
for each probability (0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9) and each gain (20, 50 and 80
euros) the median decision weight. Figures 12 to 16 show the resulting median
probability weighting functions. In the first two figures, you can find the three
median probability weighting functions (one for each gain) for each of the two
populations. Note that the functions associated with 50 and 80 euros are quite
close to each other, suggesting that people have the same attitude toward prob-
abilities for both gains. However, the probability weighting function is a bit
higher when the gain is 20 euros for both populations. One can claim that there
is a threshold between 20 euros and the two other gains. When gains are only
up to 20 euros, people may take their decisions as they were playing because
the amount at stake are unsignificant. (Bear in mind that some individual de-
cision weights may be different from the ones used to compute the median. I
do not think this is very relevant at the agregated level since these errors at the
individual level seem to have canceled out when pooling the data. For example,
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Figure 12: The median probability weighting functions of usual subjects for the
three gains 20, 50 and 80 euros
Figure 13: The median probability weighting functions of portfolio managers
for the three gains 20, 50 and 80 euros
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in the population of portfolio managers, 23 decision weights were bounded up
and 23 were bounded down).
The last two figures compare the attitude toward probabilitiesof both pop-
ulations for each of the three gains. In the three cases, there seem to be no
significant differences between the two populations.
Our results then look very different from those of Fox et al. (1996). How
can it be explained? First, the elicitation of the value function was based on
the Trade-off method in Fox et al. (1996), whereas I chose not to use data from
the Trade-off method and instead to base the elicitation of the value function
on the data from the Certainty Equivalent method. Provided the inconsistency
between the two methods highlighted in the fourth section, it is not surprising
that Fox et al. (1996) obtained linear value functions while we had concave
value functions. However, that latter statement does not explain the difference
in the elicited median probability weighting function. Indeed, I tried to consider
the value function as linear in the computation of the median decision weights
and this did not change the degree of distorsion of the probabiity weighting
function.
Second, as previously noted, the elicitation of certainty equivalents (as well as
values in the Trade-off method) was based on binary choices in one study, while
it was directly performed in the other.
The differences could also come from the fact that I only had 15 portfolio
managers whereas Fox et al. (1996) had 88 option traders 6.
Finally, it might simply be the case that option traders and portfolio man-
agers are two populations who do not behave similarly under risk.
5.5 Interpretation
In the introduction, I suggested that studying the behavior of portfolio managers
would provide us with insights about the interpretation that should be given
to the concept of attitude toward probabilities. About this topic, I mentionned
the litterature related to the Discovered Preference Hypothesis by Plott (1996).
Let us describe the relation between the present work and this litterature so as
to delimit the scope of this study.
Experiments showing departures from standard economic models have re-
ceived a major critic that can be summed up by the following quote from Bin-
more (1994):
"But how much attention should we pay to experiments that tell us how inexpe-
rienced people behave when placed in situations with which they are unfamiliar,
and in which the incentives for thinking things through carefully are negligible
or absent altogether?"
In this line Plott (1996) provided the so-called Discovered Preference Hy-
pothesis (DHP) which can be explained as follows: subjects have true prefer-
ences that satisfy the axioms of standard economic models, but in unfamiliar
contexts of decision, they need both incentives and experience about the conse-
quences of their decisions to discover those preferences. In the case of decision
under risk, this hypothesis would mean that non-linearities in the treatment
of probabilities must be considered as mistakes that will eventually vanish as
6Actually 55 option traders and 33 individuals from support staff
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Figure 14: The median probability weighting functions of usual subjects and
portfolio managers for the gain 20 euros
Figure 15: The median probability weighting functions of usual subjects and
portfolio managers for the gain 50 euros
Figure 16: The median probability weighting functions of usual subjects and
portfolio managers for the gain 80 euros
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subjects get to observe the consequences of their decisions (having enough in-
centives).
The experiment described in this paper falls into the class of experiments
criticized by the litterature related to the DPH. Although I think the incentives
provided are sufficient (as explained in the third section), the experiment in-
volves only one-shot decisions which means that people do not get to observe
the realization of the underlying risk and therefore cannot learn their true pref-
erences. So, the observe probability weighting functions can be interpreted as
preferences under risk as well as mistakes that would have disapeared if the
experiment involved feedbacks, and we cannot discriminate between those two
interpretations.
As a consequence, we shall rather focus on the particular setting of one-shot
decisions under risk. This topic of study remains relevant since many economic
decisions are one-shot decisions. For example, when one has to decide whether
or not to purchase a house, one is definitely deciding in a context without ex-
perience about the consequences of his decision.
In this context then, is the attitude toward probabilities a stable concept? Does
it vanish as people get a greater level of expertise at dealing with risk or is it
a true property of preferences? Our results definitely support the second view.
Indeed, the portfolio managers exhibited a greater aptitude at dealing with the
experimental task since their answers revealed smaller randomness. In other
words, they fitted a model of decision closer than usual subjects of experiments
but that model was not the expected utility model. Indeed, each portfolio
clearly exhibited a personal attitude toward probabilities that always (except
for individual 6) sastified the usual properties identified in previous works. Fur-
thermore, aggregated data suggest that the median portfolio manager is not
closer to the expected utility model than the median usual subject. Therefore,
we cannot even say that people with a greater aptitude at dealing with risk
show a greater level of neutrality toward probabilities.
The experiment then supports the view that the behavior revealing a dis-
tortion of probabilities reveals a robust psychophysical mechanism (in the sense
that it is not affected by the experience at dealing with risk) that must be
accounted for as soon as one wants to study one-shot decisions under risk.
6 Conclusion and further research
The present work makes two types of contributions: on the methodological side,
it proposes a new specification for the probability weighting function, namely the
cumulative distribution function of the beta law. The shape of this functional
form is governed by its two parameters in a different manner. than the existing
two-parameter functions. One parameter captures the degree of overweighting
of small probabilities while the other one controls the degree of underweighting
of large probabilities. This thus allows computing the correlation between those
two properties of the attitude toward probabilities. This correlation is up to
80% on our sample.
This paper also introduces a protocole that aims at improving tte amount of
information that is extracted from one individual in a given number of questions.
Its principle is to use prior information about the subject’s behavior (obtained
at the beginning of the experiment) to calibrate questions. The protocole makes
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both the TO and CE methods intervene. Those two techniques of elicitation
turned out to be inconsistent.
On the empirical side, the contribution consists in the study of the atti-
tude toward probabilities in the context of one-shot decisions on a population
of portfolio managers, that is people having a high level of expertise at han-
dling decision making under risk. It came out that those people were indeed
more consistent than people having less experience (like the usual subjects of
the LEEP), but this consistency did not made them converge to the expected
utility model. Instead, each portfolio managers revealed his own attiutde to-
ward probabilities.
This work opens a few interesting paths for future research. First, one of the
main lesson that must be retained from this work is how interesting are people
whose job consists in making financial decisions under uncertainty (like the
portfolio managers). Indeed, they provided us with high quality data in the sense
that their choices fit very closely to a model of decision under risk, which renders
the analysis much easier. That kind of population is also interesting because
it allows seeking for relations between preferences elicited in experiments and
some real financial decisions. If one is willing to relate experiments to reality,
this must be one of the most promising direction of research.
Another issue raised in this work is the inconsistency between the TO and
CE methods. This question should definitely be adressed experimentally at least
to check the reliability of the result. If this latter was to be confirmed, then
important questions shall be asked about both the job done in experiments and
the job done by our models.
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